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I INTRODUCTION 
The 1993 binding referendum on electoral reform heralded a new era in New Zealand's 
constitutional future. On the 6th of November 1993, New Zealanders effected a sea-
change in their constitution when they voted 53.8% in favour of changing the electoral 
system from First-Past-the Post to MMP. 1 
The endorsement of MMP has sparked much discussion and serious writing on its likely 
effect on other facets of the constitution.2 One little-discussed, but vitally important area 
of the constitution which now has a new context in which to operate is the reserve 
powers of the Governor-General-the residue of the Crown's original discretionary or 
arbitrary power to govern.3 Against this new backdrop of MMP, the reserve powers are 
thrown into sharp relief on the constitutional stage. Further elections under MMP raise 
the possibility of increased use of the reserve powers. Election results may not be as 
clear-cut as before. The Governor-General may be called on to appoint the Prime Mini-
ster or to dissolve Parliament and call another election. There may be more requests to 
the Governor-General to dissolve Parliament from a government unsure of its majority in 
a House where its support may not be guaranteed. Moreover, should she have to, our 
Governor-General will be the first head of state to exercise the reserve powers in an 
MMP context.4 
This change to the method of determining the Parliament over which the reserve powers 
are exercised justifies a re-examination of the powers themselves. 5 The immediacy of this 
3 
See The General Election and Electoral Referendum 1993, New Zealand. Parliament House 
of Representatives. Appendix to the journals, E.9: 170-171. 
See M Chen "Remedying New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: is MMP part of the an-
swer?" (1993) NZLJ 22. 
AV Dicey Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, London, 1960) 424-427. Parliamentary 
consent is not required for their exercise. Dicey's definition was cited by Lord Dunedin in 
Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd [ 1920) AC 508, 526. 
M Chen above n 2, fn 48 notes that the German Head of State is yet to exercise the 
reserve powers constitutional lawyers believe the President may have. Heads of State in 
other European proportional representation electoral systems have dealt with their 're-
serve powers' in various ways. Questions of government formation are generally delegated 
to a neutral infonnatrur (often the Speaker) who canvasses the political alliances and 
identifies a likely fonnateur to the Head of State (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Belgium 
and Holland). The dissolution of Parliament is a more complicated issue, but in general, 
the matter is left in Parliament's hands. ln fact, apart from the German situation, the 
French Constitution is the only one where the Head of State is given the power to dis-
solve Parliament unilaterally. See D Butler Governing Without a Majority (Collins, London, 
1983) 57-64 and 129. 
P Carpinter draws on systems theory to make a parallel analysis with regard to MMP and 
the public service: "If the existing system is in some sort of equilibrium, it can be predict-
ed, with varying degrees of confidence, that major change to one part of the system will 
lead to changes in the other pans." See P Carpinter "MMP and Coalitions: Possible Effects 
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requirement was underscored by the events that followed the general election held at the 
same time as the electoral referendum. The likely allocation of seats in Parliament as 
indicated by the preliminary vote count on election night was: National 49, Labour 46, 
Alliance 2, NZ First 2.6 The November 6 results appeared to have delivered a hung 
Parliament for the first time in over 65 years.7 In the days before the count was finalised8 
and the writs endorsed and returned,9 there was much conjecturing that the Governor-
General would be called upon to exercise her reserve power to appoint a Prime Minister, 
until the finalised count realised a parliamentary majority for National Party1° and ended 
the speculation. 
Although the speculation over the Governor-General's use of the reserve powers in 1993 
was not required to mature into advice concerning the formation of a government from 
a hung Parliament, there is no guarantee that such advice will not be required in the 
future. This increased possibility and the new setting for the reserve powers provide the 
catalyst for this paper, the aim of which is two-fold. Bearing in mind that "it is less easy 
to identify what the precise conventions are than to state that they exist"' 1 but also that 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
on New Zealand's Public Service" in G Hawke (ed) Changing Politics? (Institute of Policy 
Studies, Wellington, 1993) 131-132. 
Section lll(l)(b) Electoral Act 1956. 
The 1928 election delivered a Parliament of the following composition: Reform 28, Uni-
ted 27, lndependent Liberal 4, Labour 19, Country Party 1, Miscellaneous 1. See M 
Bassett Three Party Politics in Nov Zealand 1911-1931 (Historical Publications, Auckland, 
1982) 67_. 
Section 115(2)(b) Electoral Act 1956. 
Section 119(1)(a) Electoral Act 1956. 
The National Party retained the seat of Waitaki on special votes, thus gaining the 50th 
seat required for a majority in ParliamenL National's majority was later widened to two 
when Peter Tapsell (Labour, Eastern Maori) was appointed Speaker of the House. 1his 
meant that National retained its 50 seats while the Opposition was reduced to 48. The 
Speaker is bound to safeguard the Government's majority where the vote is tied by ex-
ercising a casting vote in the Government's favour on questions of confidence and supply. 
This of course still leaves the Government vulnerable to losing divisions in the House 
when Parliament goes into the Committee of the whole House and the Speaker relin-
quishes the Chair in favour of the Chairman of Committees. 1n fact the Government has 
lost one division already in 1994. See below n 63. See Speaker Harrison New Zealand 
Parliamentary Debates, vol 448, 1982: 4917-4919; D McGee Parliamentary Practice in 
New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 165. 1n the present Parliament, this 
apparently settled ruling is subject to the statement of Dr Tapsell that, although he would 
generally follow the rulings of Speaker Harrison, "in the event of any extraordinary 
circumstance occurring ... [he) reserve[d) the right to use [his) judgment at that time." 
See New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol 539, 21 December 1993-21 March 1994: 
6-7. Personal communication with the Office of the Clerk of the House suggests that Dr 
Tapsell's comments should be seen as an indication of Dr Tapsell's possible voting 
intentions, rather than be granted the status of a Speaker's Ruling. 1his should especially 
considered the case given the apparent absence of any precedent for this .. extraordinary 
circumstance" proviso. 
Sir G Palmer .. MMP and Ministerial Responsibility" (address to the .. Public Accountability 
in the MMP environment" seminar, Wellington, 11-12 April 1994) 7. 
2 
"in [the] event of [a] crisis ... it will be of vital importance immediately to know what 
the rules are"12 , this paper focuses on the reserve powers to appoint a Prime Minister 
and to refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament13 and attempts to suggest the 
conventions which might underpin these two powers, given the new context in which 
they will operate. Support for these suggested conventions will be drawn from relevant 
New Zealand and other Commonwealth precedents.14 Their suitability will be assessed 
by reference to established principles. Further, this paper also discusses the form these 
redefined conventions should take-if any. 
II THE RESERVE POWERS 
A Discretion Or Principle? 
The present constitutional position of the Governor-General is more that of symbolic 
authority than real power. Yet there is nonetheless scope for the Governor-General to 
wield real power in our constitution. Under the Constitution Act 1986 and the Letters 
Patent Constituting the Office of the Governor-General of New Zealand,15 the Governor-
General is authorised to exercise the royal powers of governance. These include those 
conferred by statute and the reserve powers. The reserve powers have been severely 
restricted by both the Bill of Rights 1689 and the growth of democratic govemment. 16 
However, some still remain. They are: power to refuse to assent to bills; power to dis-
solve Parliament" (or refuse to do so); power to summon Parliament; power to call an 
election; and the power to appoint a Prime Minister. 17 
Usually there is little opportunity for these powers to be exercised according to the 
Governor-General's discretion, as by convention, she must act on the advice of her 
12 
13 
11 
16 
17 
Sir K Keith "Canberra, 11 November 1975: What need New Zealand remember?" (address 
to the AULSA Conference, Christchurch, 22-25 August 1976) 12. 
This is because it seems that these are the powers most likely to be411 issue in an MMP 
Parliament. 
Given the change in the parliamentary context, it should be noted that many precedents 
will no longer be applicable. Any precedents referred to have therefore been carefully 
selected. 
SIR 1983/225. See also M Chen and Sir G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford 
University Press, Auckland, 1993) 251-254. 
ECS Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (10 ed, Longman, 
London, 1985) 245-247. 
See HV Evatt and EA Forsey Evatt and Forsey on the Reserve Powers (Legal Books, Sydney, 
1990) "Introduction"; FM Brookfield "No Nodding Automaton: A Study of the Governor-
General's Powers and Functions" (1978) NZLJ 491, 499. 
3 
responsible advisers. 18 Her responsible advisers are those who appear to hold the confi-
dence of the House of Representatives. 19 The proviso inherent in this convention is that 
first the Governor-General must be clear as to who those responsible advisers are. In 
some cases this will not be clear.20 At this point, an opportunity arises for the Governor-
General to exercise the reserve powers at her discretion. The present Governor-General 
has suggested that to do so would "seriously undermine the democratic basis of our 
system."21 I agree. Future exercise of the reserve powers should be firmly fixed in the 
democratic context of our constitution. The possibility of the exercise of power in an 
arbitrary fashion does not sit well with a system of democratic government. Moreover, 
underlying principles are also necessary to provide a sound basis for future exercise of 
the reserve powers. 
It is not the aim of this paper to argue that the reserve powers should not remain with 
the Governor-General.22 As long as New Zealand remains a constitutional monarchy 
there will always be the need for the Crown's role as the final safeguard against un-
democratic government.23 The point is rather that this role-and thus the means of 
carrying it out-should be democratic. The reserve powers should be exercised not 
according to discretion but to principle. 
B Principles 
Having established that the reserve powers should be exercised according to principle, 
the question still remains: what should these principles be? It should also be remem-
bered that as the reserve powers will be exercised in times of political crisis, the prin-
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
2) 
In the interests of elegance of style and factual accuracy, all references to the Governor-
General will be in the feminine gender, except for direct quotes from Constitutional 
provisions. 
Despatch of the Duke of Newcastle, Colonial Secretary, to the Governor of Queensland, 
26 March 1862 cited in RQ Quentin-Baxter "The Governor-General's constitutional dis-
cretions: an essay towards a re-definition" (1980) 10 VUWLR 289, 291. 
Eg those outlined in Part 1 above. 
Dame C Tizard "Crown and Anchor: the present role of the Governor-General in New 
Zealand" (Founder's Lecture for the Friends of the Turnbull Library, Wellington, 26 June 
1993) 9. 
For a contrary view, see A Benn "Power, Parliament and the People" (1982) Sept/Oct 
New Socialist 9. 
Should New Zealand take the step of becoming a republic, the reserve powers will need 
to be thoroughly re-assessed. The report of the Australian Republic Advisory Committee 
An Australian Republic-The Options The Report (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 
1993) 88-116 considers whether the reserve powers should be retained by a Head of 
State in an Australian republic, and if so, in what form: codified (wholly or partially) or 
as unwritten rules. Premature at this stage of constitutional change in New Zealand, the 
issue of the reserve powers in a republican New Zealand may yet become more relevant. 
ciples which guide their use should be flexible enough to take into account the political 
context in which they must operate. 
The first consideration is that the Governor-General should not only act impartially but 
should be seen to be acting impartially. As Sir Kenneth Keith notes:24 "[t]he strength of 
the Crown rests on the conviction that its neutrality is beyond suspicion." Thus the 
credibility of the reserve powers is inextricably linked to their impartial exercise. Should 
the Governor-General intervene in favour of one party or another, this would set a 
dangerous precedent for future crises. And if, under MMP, there are increased calls on 
the reserve powers it is essential that they be seen as an effective means of resolving 
constitutional dilemmas. This will not be the case if they are seen to be exercised in a 
partisan fashion. If the reserve powers are no longer held to be credible, there might be 
calls to do away with them or vest them in another body. The Governor-General's role 
as the last constitutional safeguard would be lost To avoid this, it is necessary that the 
reserve powers be exercised in a way that does not appear to favour any particular 
political party over another. 
The other principle which should underpin the exercise of the reserve powers has been 
identified as both the most fundarnental25 and also the hardest to define26: democracy. 
'Democracy' is a term eminently capable of being interpreted according to the 'Humpty 
Dumpty' principle: "When I use a word," said Humpty Dumpty, "it means just what I 
choose it to mean-neither more nor less."27 And it is undeniably true to the point of 
cliche that democracy can mean all things to all people. However, for constitutional 
lawyers, the democracy principle which infuses the reserve powers is usually understood 
to mean that "parliament is not stifled by government, but that government is held 
responsible to parliament, and every parliament held responsible to the people."28 Dis-
tilled to its essence, this means that the Governor-General should remember the par-
liamentary context in which she exercises the reserve powers. In future years New Zea-
land's parliamentary context will be that of MMP. A further investigation of what 
26 
27 
28 
Above n 12, 12. 
I Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, London, 1959) 13-19. 
Above n 12, 8. 
L Carroll Through the Looking-Glass (Golden Press, Racine, Wisconsin, 1970) 164. Law-
yers of a literary disposition may be more inclined to attribute this phrase to Atkin LJ 
who employed it in his famous dissent in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206, 245 
(HL(E)) rather than to Lewis Carroll. However, it should be noted that for both Atkin LJ 
and his American counterpart Frankfuner J who used it in his dissenting judgment in 
Shapiro v United States 335 US 1, 43 fn 5 (1948), difficulty of definition did not preclude 
definition. 
Rt Hon A Meighen quoted in above n 17, 163. 
'j 
changes are likely to Parliament under MMP is needed before we can say what this 
might mean for the democracy principle. 
C The Res0'\1£ Powas in an MMP Parliament 
It is a somewhat difficult exercise to make predictions about Parliament on a weekly 
basis, much less predict how Parliament might operate under MMP in future years. 
However, from a cautious consideration of a future MMP Parliament, a few points do 
emerge with sufficient clarity to be stated below. 
During the campaign over the electoral system referendum, MMP proponents made 
much of the fact that New Zealand has not been governed by a party with majority 
electoral support since 1951.29 Although several interpretations can be made of the vote 
for MMP in 1993 (among them electoral disgruntlement with the present Members of 
Parliament), it seems fair to say-if we remember that the core issue during the referen-
dum was a choice between a proportional and a non-proportional electoral system-that 
the vote for MMP in 1993 can be seen as a desire to change New Zealand's recent his-
tory of government by the party with the support of the largest minority of voters. The 
MMP endorsement can be interpreted as an electoral expression of desire for a govern-
ment supported also by a majority of voters. This does not preclude minority govern-
ment.30 Yet it may be that the Governor-General has to take greater care to ensure that 
her responsible advisers do indeed (in whatever composition) have the support of a 
majority of the electorate, be that direct or indirect. This may mean that the Governor-
General might require evidence of the alliances ancVor guarantees of support in the 
House of those claiming to have its confidence (or otherwise) . 
With the increased likelihood of more parties in Parliament under MMP the chances of a 
single party being able to form the government decrease. Minority or coalition govern-
ment seems more likely. 31Continued governance will depend on holding the confidence 
of the House of Representatives, which may not always be assured when the Govern-
ment does not have a majority of the House's members. Thus it seems clear that the 
29 
30 
31 
See A McRobie uElectoral System Options: Three Proposals for reforming the Electoral 
System" in H Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in Perspective (3 ed, Longman Paul, Auck-
land, 1993) 452, 454 (Table l) . 
In fact, K Strom Minority Government and Majority Rule ( Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990) 90, notes that Uthe countries most influenced by the Wesoninster 
model of democracy seem inclined to tum to minority governments rather than majority 
coalitions when their two-party systems fragment."' 
P Harris and E Mcleay UThe legislature" in above n 5, 104. 
House of Representatives will regain its traditional function: the ability to make and 
unmake governments.32 Thus as this function returns to Parliament, the Governor-Gen-
eral should not usurp it by means of the reserve powers. The place for the testing of the 
confidence of the House should therefore be the House itself. 
Another possible effect of MMP is that it may produce a Parliament with a very stable 
policy agenda, irrespective of who the actual government is.33 Although the actual policy 
mix should not be the concern of the Governor-General, it may be that elections are not 
necessary to prove which party holds the confidence of the House when the composition 
of government changes.34 Thus, in this context, it may not be appropriate for the Gover-
nor-General to resort to elections to test the reserve powers. Rather, it may be more 
fitting for the Governor-General to exercise reserve powers within a framework that 
considers parliamentary reality. 
From this discussion, it seems that the use of the reserve powers over an MMP Parlia-
ment should be constrained by two considerations. First, as the vote for MMP signifies 
an endorsement of a Parliament composed in proportion to its electoral support, the 
responsible advisers of the Governor-General must have the confidence of the House and 
so the people--directly or indirectly, and the Governor-General should require some 
evidence of that confidence, where the constitutional requirement that every potential 
government must hold the confidence of the House in order to wield the rights and 
powers of governance (amongst them the right to advise the Governor-General) assumes 
greater relevance and importance in MMP Parliaments. This is underpinned by the 
consideration that as MMP may shift power back to Parliament, this should be the 
reference point within which reserve power decisions are made. 
With the principles of neutrality and democracy set down as underpinning the reserve 
powers, let us now examine how they might inform the conventions which guide the 
exercise of the powers which are the focus of this paper: the power to refuse a request 
for a dissolution of Parliament and the power to appoint a Prime Minister. 
32 
)) 
}at 
This possibility has been noted by M Chen, above n 2, 24 and Sir G Palmer "What 
Changes are Likely to the Legislative Process and other Functions of Parliament from 
MMP?" (address to the ~MMP: Managing the PoliticaVPublic Sector Interface" seminar, 
Wellington, 24 March 1994) 1. 
P Temple Making your vote count Qohn Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992) 38. 
Above n 32, 2. 
Ill EXERCISING THE RESERVE POWERS IN AN MMP PARLIAMENT 
The convention that the Governor-General exercises her reserve powers on the advice of 
those who hold the confidence of the House is well established.35 Thus it follows that it 
is most unlikely that the Governor-General would refuse to follow the advice of a major-
ity ministry which holds the confidence of the House. It seems that only where a major-
ity government attempts to subvert the democratic process may the Governor-General 
exercise the reserve powers independently.36 This is axiomatic if we remember the Gov-
ernor-General's role as the upholder of our democratic constitution. Such cases will be 
rare. Thus I focus instead on those situations where the Governor-General receives 
advice from a minority ministry or party. In these cases there is no convention that she 
must accede to it as it is not clear that her advisers hold the House's confidence. 
A The Power to Refuse a Request for a Dissolution l,efor£ dt£ Summoning 
of Parliamoat 
Should an election under MMP return a Parliament where no one party holds a majority 
of seats, is the Governor-General obliged to follow the advice of the leader of the largest 
minority that a fresh election be called in order that a majority government (or a larger 
minority) be elected, should this advice be tendered? 
The combined weight of principle, New Zealand precedent and the opinions of constitu-
tional writers bears· against the acceptance of any such advice. Forsey states flatly:37 
"[ there is] no right to an immediate second dissolution before the new House can meet." 
To grant a second dissolution would be a dismissal of the original electoral verdict by 
the Crown. This undermines the democratic foundations of our constitution. It is the 
3~ 
36 
37 
See above Pan II A. 
Examples where an independent exercise of the reserve powers appears to be justified 
include refusing the advice of a m.inisrry governing by corrupt means or a series of re-
quests for a dissolution from a government with a small majority made with the sole 
intention of successively increasing that majority. See above n 17, 124 and 270; G Mar-
shall Constitutional Conventions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984) 38. KJ Scott The 
New Zealand Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962) 76 considers that these ex-
amples apply to New Zealand as well. Probably the most well-known (and commented 
on) example this century is the 1932 dismissal of the majority Lang Government of New 
South Wales by Governor Game. Few would go as far as Dicey and maintain that the 
Crown's power to dissolve Parliament is subject only to considerations of whether the 
Government is acting in accordance with the wishes of the electorate. See above n 3, 
433-435. Governments often make unpopular decisions and using public opinion as the 
sole criterion for dissolving a Parliament with a majority government on the Crown's 
initiative is questionable to say the least 
Above n 17, "Introduction" xxv. 
8 
role of the Governor-General to safeguard the constitution, not challenge it. Lord Hal-
dane also considered that such a request should be refused on the basis that the Govern-
or-General "cannot entertain any bargain for dissolution merely with a possible Prime 
Minister before the latter is fully installed. [She] cannot, before that event, properly 
weigh the general situation and the parliamentary position of the Ministry as formed."38 
This aligns with the New Zealand Cabinet Office Manual which states that the Governor-
General acts on the advice of her Ministers.39 Logically prior to this is the proposition 
that those who tender this advice must have a mandate to give it. In cases where the 
ministry is merely possible, its mandate to tender this advice must also be unconfirmed. 
Therefore the Governor-General should be under no obligation to accept it and, a for-
tiori, entitled to refuse iL 
Principle also counsels against accepting this advice. Should the Governor-General con-
sent to a further dissolution this could not be seen as anything other than partisan 
support for the party which proposed it, be it the defeated Government or its main 
Opposition. The precedent value of such an action should not be underestimated. To act 
so breaches the neutrality principle which should guide the Crown. Moreover, the demo-
cracy principle demands that the matter be referred to Parliament, not left in the hands 
of the Governor-General alone. By directing the question of dissolution to Parliament, 
the Governor-General not only affirms the resurgence of Parliament that MMP brings 
but removes the Crown from suspicion of party political bias by intervening on behalf of 
no party. This view is reinforced by the practices of New Zealand Governors-General 
during the days of ·uncertain Parliaments this century."° Governors-General presiding 
over the parliaments of 1912 and 1928 did not call for new elections but thought it best 
to summon Parliament as quickly as possible to let Parliament resolve the constitutional 
issues. 
Were the question of a second dissolution to arise after an MMP election it seems that 
precedent and principle conclude that the Governor-General would be entitled to refuse 
advice to call a second election, especially where the mandate to tender this advice is 
unconfirmed. Instead, she should submit the question of dissolution to Parliament, so 
upholding the democratic nature of the New Zealand constitution and the neutrality 
principle. 
38 
39 
-40 
Quoted in above n 25, 424 (emphasis added). 
(Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1991) 3. 
For a full and detailed exposition of parliamentary practice in this era, see above n 7. 
9 
B The Power to Appoint a Prime Minister 
Once the question of an immediate second dissolution is settled, the next question 
which arises where no clear majority in the House can be ascertained simply on the 
basis of seats held is: which party shall govern? Where no one party holds a majority of 
seats, recourse must be made to the Governor-General's reserve power to appoint a 
Prime Minister. 
While hung Parliaments are not unusual in the Commonwealth, they are not rare. The 
past 30 years have seen five such Parliaments in Australia alone, four in Canada, and one 
in the UK, the most recent being Tasmania in 1989.41 New Zealand history also fur-
nishes us with a precedent from 1928.42 The precedents this century, as Brazier notes, 
provide the Governor-General with a "dazzling array" of options when using the reserve 
powers to address the issue of forming a government from a hung Parliament. H There 
could be a minority government with no support from other parties in the House,44 a 
minority government with the pledged support of other parties on confidence matters,45 
a minority coalition, a majority coalition of two46 or three47 parties, a national coalition 
of all the parties48-almost every permutation possible is represented in history. 
Yet whatever the composition of the government which emerges as a result of the Gov-
ernor-General's exercise of her reserve power to appoint a Prime Minister, there remains 
one constant. That constant is the general rule guiding the exercise of this reserve pow-
er: that the Governor-General should appoint as Prime Minister that person who appears 
capable of securing the confidence of the House of Representatives.'19 
11 
12 
1) 
11 
<16 
47 
18 
49 
South Australia 1968 and 1989, Tasmania 1969 and 1989, New South Wales 1991; 
Canada 1968 and 1979, Newfoundland 1971, Ontario 1985; United Kingdom 1974. See 
G Winterton "Tasmania's Hung Parliament" [1992) Public Law 423. See also D Butler and 
DA low (eds) Sovereigns and Surrogates: Constitutional Heads of St.ate in the Commonwealth 
(St Martin's Press, New York, 1991) Appendix II for a table of post-WWII hung Parlia-
ments. 
Above n 7. 
R Brazier "Government Formation from a Hung Parliament" [1986) Public Law 387. 
Eg the UK in 1924 and 1974. 
Eg the UK in 1977-1978 and Tasmania in 1989. 
Eg the UK in 1900-1905 and Ontario in 1985. 
Eg the UK in 1931-1940. 
Eg the UK in 1916-1922. 
See above n 17, lxxii-lxxiv; above n 43: "that person who appears best able to command 
the support of a stable majority in the House ... or failing [that) that politician who 
seems able to form a government with a reasonable prospect of maintaining that admini-
stration in office."; above n 16, 236-237: "In appointing a Prime Minister the Sovereign 
must appoint that person who is in the best position to receive the support of the major-
ity in the House"; SA de Smith and R Brazier Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, 
Penguin Books, London, 1989) 161: "the general rule is that in appointing a Prime Mini-
JO 
Indisputable as it is that this principle should guide the power of appointment, the same 
cannot be said for the procedure by which the Governor-General is to ascertain the will 
of Parliament. How is this principle to be effected? It should be noted at this stage that 
any procedure decided upon should be firmly underpinned by the principles of Crown 
neutrality and framed by reference to the renewed vitality of Parliament which the MMP 
era is likely to bring. 
Given the new MMP context for reserve power decisions by the Governor-General, 
Commonwealth precedents are informative rather than determinative of any procedure 
our Governor-General should follow. In concert with constitutional writers, precedent 
points to three possible options: that the Governor-General should ask the defeated 
incumbent Prime Minister for advice as to his or her successor; that she should call on 
each party leader to form a government (or at the very least, for that leader's opinion on 
whether he or she could do so); and finally, that the Governor-General's role should be 
to consult party leaders in order to ascertain the party leader most likely to hold the 
House's confidence, but only once the politicians have themselves arrived at this out-
come. In other words, the third option becomes a "political decision ... politically 
arrived at",50 from which the Governor-General takes her cue as to whom the govern-
ment shall be. 
1 Seeking adviu from the incwnbent Prime Minister 
On at least two occasions (the United Kingdom in 1974 and Tasmania in 1989), the 
Crown has taken advice from the incumbent Prime Minister as to his successor. 51 Prem-
ier Gray in Tasmania, heading a minority administration, informed the Governor that his 
Llberal Party should remain in office and continue to hold power on the basis that they 
held the most seats in the House. later, he also expressed doubts about the ability of his 
opponents to adhere to the pact of political support they had negotiated. The Governor 
,0 
ster, the Queen should commission that person who appears best able to command the 
suppon of a stable majority in the House"; above n 36, 82: "The Governor-General's 
overriding concern should be a desire to obtain a Prime Minister who can obtain the 
suppon of a majority irJ the existirlg Parliament" 
Above n 43, 389 and 393. 
lt is salient to note at this poirlt that the outgoing Prime Minister is generally considered 
to have no right to give this advice but is nonetheless under a duty to give it if requested. 
See above n 17, l.xviii and above n 43, 395-396. Contrast however Practices Recognized 
and Declared by resolution of the Australian Constitutional Convention (Parliament House, 
Brisbane, July 29-August l 1985) Practice B appended to C Sampford and D Wood 
"Codification of Constitutional Conventions irJ Australia" (1987) Public Law 231, which 
does not make a distirlction between those situations where the incomirlg government is 
obvious and those where it is not. 
II 
followed his advice and swore the Liberals into office. 52 
This procedure is subject to a number of criticisms which cast doubts on its appropriate-
ness for a New Zealand Parliament under MMP. The first is that the electoral mandate of 
the Prime Minister to tender that advice has expired. It may yet be reconfirmed by 
Parliament but that is not certain. Meanwhile, the Governor-General accords the ad-
vantage of a first hearing to a Prime Minister whose advice has the status of personal 
opinion only. While it has been claimed that the outgoing Prime Minister's advice would 
be backed by many years of political experience and there would be nothing wrong with 
the Governor-General utilising this experience to aid her in exercising the reserve pow-
ers,53 the merits of this course of action are not convincing. The incumbent Prime Mini-
ster is foremost the leader of a political party rather than a neutral adviser to the Gov-
ernor-General. He or she would obviously have a vested interest in retaining power and 
whatever advice was given would carry the taint of self-interest. It might even be the 
case that the Prime Minister would recommend that a further general election be held 
rather than any attempt be made to meet with Parliament at all.5'4 
Matters are further complicated when the Governor-General has had previous political 
affiliations, such as with the present Governor-General, Sir Paul Reeves and Sir Keith 
Holyoake. There is no guarantee that this will not be the case in future. In such a situa-
tion, the Governor-General's seeking advice from the Prime Minister would inevitably be 
vulnerable to further claims of political bias. 55 
The combination of obtaining advice from the incumbent Prime Minister and the fact 
that the Governor-General may have his or her own political connections constitutes a 
direct breach of the principle of Crown neutrality. David Butler comments that "[i]t 
would be widely seen as outrageous if, in an essentially adversarial situation, the umpire 
had to act on the advice of one of the protagonists. "56 This comment achieves greater 
significance when there could be claims that the umpire is biased as well. Not only must 
the Crown act impartially, the Crown should also be seen to act impartially. This will not 
53 
Accounts of the proceedings are to be found in above n 41; A Castles "Post-election 
Constitutional Usage in the Shadow of Mount Wellington: Tasmania's Constitutional 
Crisis 1989" (1989) 12 Adel LR 292; ID Killey "Tasmania: A New Convention" (1991) 2 
Public LR 221; "Documents Concerning the Constitutional Events which Surrounded the 
Tasmanian General Election in 1989" (1991) 2 Public LR 4. 
Above n 43, 396. 
See above Part Ill A. 
These issues are canvassed in the Auckland District Law Society Public Issues Committee 
publication The Holyoake Appointment (ADLS, Auckland, 1977). 
Above n 4, 91. 
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happen when the Governor-General calls on only the outgoing Prime Minister for ad-
vice. 
2 Gilling on each party lea.du in tum 
To avoid allegations of bias in the Governor-General's exercise of the reserve powers, it 
has been suggested that the Governor-General should call on each party leader and ask 
him or her to form a government in turn. 
This solution too is not without its attendant problems. Apart from the concern that no 
party leader has a confirmed mandate to advise the Governor-General, the Governor-
General would have to be very careful about the order in which she called on the party 
leaders, or again, her impartiality would be in doubt. Although this could generally be 
avoided by calling on each leader according to that party's share of seats in the House, 
thus effecting the electorate's preference as reflected in the allocation of seats to each 
party, it would be a nice question for the Governor-General if two parties were to tie.57 
Further, suppose that each party were to meet with Parliament in turn, attempt to gain 
its confidence and fail because it had not the assured support of other parties required 
for a majority vote in the House. Of course, there is the additional possibility that some 
parties will not even wish to meet the House as defeat will be certain. In each case, the 
country will have been subjected to a succession of potential Prime Ministers. It is likely 
that the Governor-General would have to call a second general election as no party had 
proven itself capable of holding the confidence of the House. 
3 Consultation after political n£gOtiarions 
Both the options outlined above present problems both from the standpoint of preserv-
ing the Governor-General's neutrality and affirming Parliament's function of making and 
unmaking governments. It is preferable that the Governor-General should refrain from 
direct intervention in the political process. As parliament has the task of determining 
which party (or parties) should govern through the convention that the government 
must hold the confidence of the House, it would be no great extension of that conven-
tion to expect that the parties themselves would find the parliamentary grouping (minor-
ity government or coalition or majority coalition) most likely to satisfy that convention 
before the confidence of the House is actually tested in Parliament. 
,1 As they did in the UK in 1910. 
Once the grouping likely to hold the confidence of the House has emerged from political 
negotiations, it would then be the responsibility of the Governor-General to satisfy 
herself that this is indeed the case. This however, would be a constitutional issue. The 
Governor-General would be seen to be removed from deciding political questions. 
It is submitted that the most appropriate means of ascertaining whether or not the group 
which appears to hold the confidence of Parliament actually does so is by consultation 
with the relevant party leaders. This was the course followed by the Tasmanian Gover-
nor in 1989, who called individually on the Independent members of the Tasmanian 
Parliament in order to assure himself of their commitment to a pact pledging support for 
the main opposition Labor Party (the "Parliamentary Accord") which would give the 
Labor Party majority support in Parliament.58 This was in addition to earlier consultation 
with the Labor Party leader to confirm that he felt assured of the Independents' sup-
port. 59 The Governor also had written evidence of this Independents/Labor pact in the 
Parliamentary Accord negotiated between them. 
This course of action was presciently foreshadowed by RQ Quentin-Baxter, who wrote in 
1980:60 
Where no pany has a majority of seats, it will be the normal course for party leaders to 
conduct their own discussions until [ the group which is likely to hold the confidence of 
the House) identifies itself and its leader. In such circumstances, the Governor-General 
will no doubt wish to satisfy himself by consultation that he understands correctly the 
alignment of parliamentary forces. 
Nominating that the Governor-General should appoint the Prime Minister after consult-
ing with the likely candidate and his or her supporters, once Parliament has identified 
that person, as the procedure our Governor-General should follow has the support of 
precedent and constitutional writers. It also has the desirable effect of removing the 
Governor-General from the arena of political decision-making, so upholding her neutral-
ity, and gives back Parliament its role as government-maker. It is my opinion that should 
the Governor-General be called upon to use her reserve power to appoint a Prime Mini-
ster in an MMP Parliament, this is the course of action she should follow. 
,a Above n 41 , 4 31. The Liberals held 17 seats, Labor 13 and the Independents 5 in the 35 
seat Parliament 
Above n 41,430. 
Above n 19, 307. 
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However, should the government formed according to this procedure fail shortly after its 
appointment, it is likely that the Governor-General's decision will be criticised. To pre-
empt, or at least diffuse, this criticism, it is submitted that any negotiations of political 
party support upon which the Governor-General has based her decision should be put in 
writing. Alternatively, the Governor-General herself could put forth her understanding of 
the parliamentary situation in writing. Either, or both, of these documents could then be 
tabled in Parliament for the public record. 61 
In the event that no apparent government emerges from party discussions, it seems clear 
that the only course available for the Governor-General would be to summon Parliament 
and let it resolve the matter. In this, she would be following the same course as her 
predecessors in 1912 and 1928.62 Moreover, she would again allow Parliament to deter-
mine its government rather than imposing a solution on it from above. If even this 
option failed, it would seem that there would be no other alternative but to dissolve 
Parliament and call another general election, leaving it to the electorate to determine the 
government more conclusively. 
4 Gubernatorial responsibility for government stability 
The Governor of Tasmania in 1989 appeared to consider that it was part of his duty to 
appoint a Prime Minister to ensure that any decision he made would "result in stable 
Government for a reasonable period of time."63 Most probably he derived this view from 
the writings of Lascelles, who wrote in 1950 that the Sovereign should attempt to find a 
"Government for a reasonable period with a working majority in the Housen<>-t and Jenn-
ings, who considered that the proper function of a constitution was to provide a govern-
ment with a stable rnajority.65 
However, if the Governor-General must consider the question of government stability, 
this necessarily draws her into a consideration of the merits of the parties-a political, 
rather than a constitutional consideration. If political considerations were to be factored 
into the exercise of the reserve power, the Governor-General's neutrality is again called 
into doubt. This should be avoided, if at all possible. 
61 
62 
63 
~ 
6) 
As was effectively done in Tasmania. See "Documents Concerning" above n 52. 
See above n 7. 
As did the Lieutenant-Governor of Ontario in 1985. See ID Killey, above n 52, 223. 
Quoted in above n 16, 240. 
Above n 25, 427. 
l '5 
Moreover, the reserve power is that of appointing a Prime Minister, not securing stable 
government. The ultimate function of the reserve powers is to ensure that "Parliament 
... shall in the long run give effect to the will of ... the political sovereign ie of the 
electoral body. "66 The Governor-General's role is therefore to ascertain the will of the 
people as represented in the Parliament they have elected. With MMP, the will of the 
people is more likely to be proportionately translated into parliamentary representation. 
Thus it may well be the case that a hung Parliament represents an electoral will for a 
"Government with a precarious and shifting rnajority."67 It is submitted that the Gover-
nor-General should be cognisant of this will as to do otherwise would be to by-pass the 
will of the electorate and frustrate the democratic process by requiring a different result 
from that indicated by the electorate. Questions of stability should therefore play no pan 
in the Governor-General's decision. 
C The Power to Refuse a Request for a Dissolution once the House is in 
Session 
Requests for a dissolution during a parliamentary session entail different considerations 
from those made before the House has had a chance to meet. In this case, a ministry has 
been installed and its mandate to tender advice confirmed by Parliament. That mandate 
is lost, and the consequent request for a dissolution made,<,a when the government fails 
to pass supply or loses a confidence vote.69 As Parliament is now convened, the Gover-
nor-General should therefore take cognisance of it in making her decision to refuse the 
request or not. 70 This is the orthodox expression of the general principle upon which a 
Governor-General may refuse a dissolution request from a minority government.7 1 The 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
Above n 3, 429-430. 
Above n 17, xvii. 
Or as RQ Quentin-Baxter suggests in above n 19, 315, the other option for a Prime 
Minister who has lost the confidence of the House is to tender his resignation. 
Occasional defeats on other matters should not be construed as meaning that the Govern-
ment no longer has the confidence of the House. Only the loss of votes on supply and 
other confidence motions can have this import. This is well illustrated by the National 
Government's June 14, 1994 defeat on the procedural motion that a select committee 
repon on the performance of the Electricity Corporation be accepted by the House. The 
Government neither resigned nor requested a dissolution. 
It should be noted that New Zealand has wimessed only two requests for a dissolution 
before the usual expiry of the parliamentary term this century (1951 and 1984). Both 
were from majority governments. The risk of electorate disapproval of those seen to be 
seeking dissolution for political advantage or with doubtful justifications, as the 1984 
request was widely perceived to be, should be enough of a disincentive to ensure that 
dissolutions are not actually requested unless a confidence measure has actually been lost 
by the Government 
See, for example above n 43, 118: ~the Queen may properly refuse a Prime Minister's 
request for a dissolution if she has substantial grounds for believing (i) that an alternative 
government enjoying the confidence of a majority of the House of Commons, can be 
16 
central consideration for the Governor-General is whether there exists in Parliament an 
alternative ministry capable of securing the confidence of the House. 72 As the defeated 
government was a minority one, there is theoretically an alternative in the House. Un-
derpinning the task of finding an alternative ministry is the question of proof. How 
much evidence should the Governor-General require of the existence of this new mini-
stry? 
It is submitted that when deciding whether or not to refuse a dissolution request, one 
method of satisfying the question of an alternative ministry is for the Governor-General 
to require written statements from party leaders outlining their party's voting intentions 
on the questions of supply and confidence, given the current state of play on the par-
liamentary stage. For instance, suppose that the minority government of party A has just 
been defeated on a vote declared to be a confidence matter. It asks for a dissolution. 
Party B and party C form the main opposition parties along with the smaller party D. 
Party B could govern in a majority coalition with party C or as a minority government 
with the pledged support of parties C and D. Rather than_ immediately call a general 
election with its attendant risks of "revolving door" Prime Ministers,73 the Governor-
General could call on the leaders of parties C and D and request that they make clear 
their voting intentions. This would establish the existence of an alternative ministry with 
the confidence of the House, or otherwise. These documents should be tabled in Parlia-
ment for the public record. Thus the grounds on which the decision was made would be 
72 
7) 
formed without a general election, and (ii) that a general election held at that time would 
be clearly prejudicial to the national interesL"; above n 16, 240 (quoting Sir Alan Las-
celles' May 2, 1950 letter to The Times) "If the Sovereign can be satisfied that (1) an 
existing Parliament is still vital and capable of doing its job, (2) a general election would 
be detrimental to the national economy, more particularly if it followed closely on the 
last election, and (3) he could rely on finding another Prime Minister who was willing to 
carry on his Government ... the Sovereign could constitutionally refuse to grant a dissolu-
tion to the Prime Minister in office."; BS Markesinis The Theory and Practice of Dissolution 
of Parliament (Cambridge University Press, London, 1972) 92: "an alternative government 
is a crucial factor."; Lord Simon quoted in Markesinis, 92: "can the defeated Prime Mini-
ster go to the Sovereign and demand another general election and is the Sovereign bound 
to grant this request? Of course not. But why not? Because there is an alternative Govern-
ment available, without sending the electorate again to the polls." New Zealand Gover-
nors-General who have considered this principle in the context of the Byng-King affair 
(see below Part Ill C) have considered that this is the correct course of action. See Vis-
count Cobham "The Governor-General's Constitutional Role" in L Oeveland and AD 
Robinson Readings in New Zealand Government (AW & AH Reed, Wellington, 1977) 82, 
85. 
I exclude from consideration questions of the health of the economy, given the current 
diversity of views as to the preferred economic orthodoxy. Were economic health to be a 
consideration for the Governor-General and a decision made on that basis, this would 
appear to be an endorsement of a particular party's policy. This would be a direct con-
travention of the neutrality principle, and as I have already stated (above Pan II C) the 
actual policy mix of the Parliament should not be the province of the Governor-General. 
R Brazier Constitutional Practice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988) 36. 
17 
transparent. This would absolve the Crown from any accusations of bias as the decision 
would be seen to be based on a calculation of the numbers in Parliament and not the 
Governor-General's own political judgment.H Moreover, New Zealand's Governor-Gener-
al would avoid the controversy that has dogged the unfortunate Canadian Governor 
Lord Byng in the aftermath of his 1926 decision to refuse a dissolution to his Prime 
Minister Mr King on the basis that the Opposition's Mr Meighen could form an alterna-
tive ministry. 75 This proved not to be the case. Lord Byng was placed in the invidious 
position of having to grant Mr Meighen the dissolution he had refused Mr King. Mr 
King's Liberal Party was triumphantly returned to office. History is not kind to those 
who make mistakes.76 This system should ensure that the risk of making a similar mis-
take is minimised. 77 
To further ensure that there is indeed an alternative ministry available, the Governor-
General may refer the issue to Parliament, to be determined by a test vote in the 
House.78 
Of course, should no such support of party B be assured (or any other combination 
which may be able to form an alternative ministry) then the Governor-General would be 
justified in granting Party A's request for a dissolution. Further, if the new government 
proves unable to govern (due to a breaking of alliances or a loss of members eg through 
a by-election) then it is proper for the Governor-General to allow the dissolution re-
quested and let the electorate break the parliamentary deadlock. This would be on the 
basis that the House had now pronounced its confidence in both the old and alternative 
government and had found them both lacking. 
7't 
76 
77 
78 
R Brazier above n 43, 406 argues that the decision should be left with the Queen as her 
long experience as Head of State means that she is "ideally placed to moderate between 
any competing wishes of party leaders . .. and indeed that she has ample expenise at her 
disposal to enable her to do so." However, New Zealand Governors-General serve as Head 
of State for a limited time (5 years) and so do not have the time to accumulate the politi-
cal acumen imputed to the Queen. This is a strong reason for requiring the Governor-
General to make her decision on the basis of information provided by the parliamentary 
actors. 
Lord Byng based his decision on Mr Meighen's assurances that he could form a govern-
ment These assurances were based on informal promises of suppon from a number of 
Progressive Pany members. Yet the Governor-General did not consult the Progressives 
himself and in fact, the Progressives maintained that "Mr Meighen had no assurance from 
our group, nor did he seek any assurance .... No promise had been made." See above n 
17, 134. 
For a comprehensive examination of this incident see above n 17, 131-250. 
At least on the Governor-General's pan. 
Adapted from a suggestion in HV Evatt "The Discretionary Authority of Dominion Gover-
nors" (1940) 18 Canadian Bar Rev 1, 4. 
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This method satisfies the democracy principle posited above in that any possible alterna-
tive ministry will have to have the support of a majority of the House's members (and 
thus a majority of the electorate)-whether this be coalition or minority government. 
Further, the decision is made within Parliament and avoids recourse to a general elec-
tion,79 in line with Parliament's restored function under MMP of making and unmaking 
governments.80 By effectively leaving the burden of proof of an alternative ministry in 
Parliament's hands, rather than the Governor-General's, this method also accords with 
the neutrality principle. 
Precedents for refusing dissolution requests are rare. However, New Zealand does have 
its own precedent for this situation. It occurred in 1877. Some of the Governor's reasons 
are no longer relevant.81 However, amongst his reasons were his opinions that the ques-
tion of the party which held Parliament's confidence "may yet be solved without a Dis-
solution" and that the Government had "produced no evidence in support of [its view 
that a working majority could be produced only by dissolution] .nB2 Thus both New 
Zealand precedent and orthodox constitutional theory support the Governor-General 
refusing a dissolution on the grounds that an alternative ministry capable of governing 
exists (with appropriate evidence) without recourse to a general election. Governor 
Normanby in 1877 included some considerations which are, it is submitted, matters of 
practical commonsense to which any Governor-General should have regard: whether 
there was any great political question which should be submitted for the electorate's 
verdict;83 and what the situation was with regard to supply. 
The dissolution of Parliament is an issue which continues to fascinate those who involve 
themselves with constitutional matters. Occasionally, discussion strays from the tradi-
tional confines of the realm of Crown power and posits a new approach to the tricky 
questions which arise regarding when, and in which circumstances, Parliament should be 
79 
80 
81 
82 
8 ) 
Unless, of course, no alternative minisuy appears. See above Part Ill C. 
Frequent general elections would be disruptive and would mean that there was more 
electioneering than governing during our already short parliamentary term. It is hard to 
justify this as perpetual function of ParliamenL 
For instance, Governor Normanby included amongst his concerns the fact that an elec-
tion would interfere with the harvesting and shearing seasons. See Dissolution of Parlia-
ment (1877) New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representatives. Appendix to the jour-
nals vol 1, A.7 : 3 (emphasis added). 
Above n 81, 3. 
This was in fact the case when the Governor-General acceded to a request for an early 
dissolution in 1951. See Sir J Marshall "The Power of Dissolution as Defined and Ex-
ercised in New Zealand" (1977) LVIII The Parliamentarian 13, 15. If the fact that a great 
public issue needs to be decided is sufficient reason for granting a dissolution, then its 
absence should point towards refusal. 
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dissolved. Tony Benn argued that "the best way to avoid [the Crown's involvement in 
political matters] would be to transfer the power of dissolution ... to the Speaker.»a4 To 
this end, he introduced the Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) Bill 
1988.85 The Bill made provision for the Speaker to advise the Queen on the time of 
dissolution after confirmation by the House of Commons.86 The Bill did not progress 
past its first reading87 but it nonetheless raises an interesting question for New Zealand-
ers: should such a measure be adopted here? 
RQ Quentin-Baxter considered this question and answered it in the negative. My answer 
is the same.88 The objectives of the Bill-affirming the sovereignty of Parliament and 
preserving the neutrality of the Crown-are already achievable here89 without the need 
for legislation.OO-Oecisions which are political need not be controversial if they are made 
according to clear principles. Moreover, if politicians take responsibility for the Gover-
nor-General's decision by means of written statements, then Mr Benn's dislike of unac-
countable decision-makers is neutralised.91 
The Bill's suggested solution to dissolution difficulties also raises practical difficulties. 
What if a request to dissolve Parliament is made before Parliament meets and the in-
cumbent Speaker has been defeated? A new Speaker cannot be elected before Parliament 
meets. There might be no-one with the status to act. Yet the Governor-General is always 
appointed during, not between parliamentary terms. Further, when the parliamentary 
arithmetic is complex, who is to say that a Speaker will not be appointed from what 
eventually transpires to be the Opposition?92 This may in itself change the likely vote. 
Vesting this power in the Speaker may also diminish his standing as a neutral arbiter of 
M 
a, 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Above n 22, 14. 
See Appendix I. 
Above n 85, s 2. 
See Gt Brit Parliamentary Debates v 129 (1988): 1109. 
See RQ Quentin-Baxter, above n 19, 306-307. However, his rejection of such a measure 
was based on a desire not to shonen funher New Zealand's already shon (by internation-
al standards) parliamentary term. 
Titat is, if the guidelines discussed in Pan III are adopted. 
As G Palmer Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) 139-140 
notes: ~New Zealand passes too many laws and it passes them too quickly .... New 
Zealanders exhibit an irmocent and misplaced faith in the efficacy of legislation .. .. 
legislation is passed for which there is no legal need." 
Pan of the impetus for the Bill appears to have been that the right to advise a dissolution 
of Parliament rests solely with the Prime Mirlister in the UK See R Blackburn ~The 
Dissolution of Parliament: The Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) Bill 
1988" (1989) 52 Modem law Review 837, 838. This does not appear to be the case in 
New Zealand. See A Quentin-Baxter Review of the Letters Patent 1917 Constituting the 
Office of Governor-General of New Zea.land (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1980) 116 para 
143. 
As did in fact occur in 1993. 
parliamentary debate. "It is one thing to make day-to-day decisions on procedural priori-
ties, acting by precedent. It is quite another to be a political fixer in the grand manner. 
The two roles might well conflict."93 
The decision to refuse a request for a dissolution should remain with the Governor-
General. In considering this request, the main criterion should be whether an alternative 
ministry exists already, capable of securing the House's confidence. Its existence should 
be confirmed either by a vote in Parliament or by written assurances of support from the 
Parliament. These methods not only uphold Parliament's regained function of govern-
ment-maker but also ensure that the Crown appears impartial in its decision-thus 
ensuring the credibility of the reserve powers. 
IV CODIFICATION OF THE RESERVE POWERS CONVENTIONS 
An analysis of the reserve powers in an MMP Parliament in the light of precedent and 
principle provides three possible conventions which the Governor-General may choose 
to adopt to guide her when exercising her powers to refuse a request for a dissolution of 
Parliament and to appoint a Prime Minister. It is submitted that they should be stated as 
follows: 
(i) Power to refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament before the summoning of 
Parliament: the Governor-General should refuse the request and instead call Parliament as soon 
as practicable so that it may resolve any necessary constitutional issues. 
(ii) Power to appoint a Prime Minister: The Governor-General should appoint that person 
who seems best able to hold the confidence of the House of Representatives. That person should 
be identified after party political negotiations and, once identified, the Governor-General should 
satisfy herself that this is indeed the case by consultation with the appropriate parties. 
(iii) Power to refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament when Parliament is in 
session: Parliament should not be dissolved if an alternative government exists in the House. The 
Governor-General should request that party leaders make clear their intended parliamentary 
alliances (preferably in writing) in order to determine whether this possible alternative govern-
ment exists. If no such government is evidenced, the dissolution request should be acceded to. 
These posited conventions are as yet untried, much less accepted. They do not yet satisfy 
Jenning's test for the existence of a constitutional convention, which was approved by 
the Canadian Supreme Court.94 The test for establishing the existence of a constitutional 
convention asks three questions:95 [nirst, what are the precedents; secondly, did the 
9) 
9-1 
Above n 4, 87. 
Refcrrnce Re Amrndmrnt of the Constitution of Canada (1982) 125 DLR (3d) l, 90. 
I Jennings The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, London, 1959) 136. 
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actors in the precedents believe that they were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a 
reason for the rule? 
Jennings test cannot be regarded as satisfied as the conventions suggested in this paper 
cannot reach precedent status until they are actually employed. Nonetheless, suppose 
that in future years, these possible conventions realise actual convention status. Once 
this stage has been reached, calls for codification are likely. This part of the paper as-
sesses the arguments for and against codification in both statutory and extra-statutory 
form. Extra-statutory codification could take place in the Cabinet Office Manual or be 
effected by adoption of the convention by resolution of the House.96 However, for the 
main part, the debate over codification centres on the enactment of conventions in 
statutory form. Therefore, this shall also be the focus of this part of the paper.97 
The most ardent advocate of codifying the reserve powers' underlying conventions was 
the highly respected HV Evatt. His argument was that the reserve powers were unclear 
and vague; that the circumstances in which they could be validly exercised were un-
certain; that precedent and writers of authority on the powers furnished conflicting 
general rules for crisis situations; and that, in any event, there was no 'independent 
tribunal" to make a final determination on any general rule or its application.98 As a cure 
for these ills, he proposed the remedy of codification.99 The formulation of precise rules 
would bring certainty to this grey area of the constitution; otherwise, he maintained, 
with dark foreboding, "the near future must see the end of political democracy."100 
With all due respect, it seems hardly necessary to point out that the statutory codifica-
tion of constitutional conventions does not appear to have been the necessary pre-condi-
tion for continued democracy in Australia, New Zealand, Canada or the United Kingdom 
in the years since Evatt issued his pessimistic prediction. History has shown that con-
tinued democracy cannot be the determining factor propelling us towards codification. 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
This was the suggestion of RQ Quentin-Baxter, above n 19, 314. 
However, my remarks should generally be taken to apply to extra-statutory codification as 
well. 
Above n 17, 269-288 and see especially the summary of Evatt's argument on page 288. 
Evatt never answers the question of definition which precedes codification ie how are the 
content and the scope of the reserve powers he intends to codify to be decided? Instead 
he blithely asserts that ~there should not be any insuperable dificulty in reaching agree-
ment as to the rules governing the exercise of the reserve powers and prerogatives, either 
in England or in any of the Dominions", above n 13, 281. This is an interesting statement 
given that he had just devoted the previous two chapters to demonstrating the difficulty 
constitutional writers had had in formulating general rules from the conflicting prece-
dents. 
Above n 17, 281. 
The more important reason for codification must therefore be certainty. In constitutional 
crises, the Crown must know what its powers are, how to exercise them and where to 
find them-preferably in a statute. Although this requirement of certainty is indisputably 
important, it is not so undisputable that enactment in statutory or extra-statutory is the 
only way to achieve this goal. The wheels of the New Zealand constitutional system are 
oiled daily by numerous conventions which exist nowhere in written form but are none 
the less certain for all that. The role and powers of Cabinet in modern government is 
one such example. 
Moreover, attempts to make certain the powers of the Governor-General by statutory 
enactment have proved exceedingly difficult. This is because the reserve powers, by their 
very nature, are powers which are spotlighted only when Parliament cannot fulfil its 
normal function. It is difficult to envisage what these circumstances may be, much less 
set out "in detail, comprehensively and with precision"101 what the Governor-General 
should do when faced with the dilemma which arises out of parliamentary breakdown. 
These problems are well demonstrated in the Constitutions of countries which have 
adopted Evatt's suggestion. In fact, such Constitutions tend to leave the Governor-Gener-
al with very little guidance as to how her discretionary powers should be exercised. For 
instance, on the question of appointment, "Malaysia, Singapore, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Uganda and Kenya [provide in their Constitutions] that the Prime Minister 'is to be a 
person who appears "likely" to command the support of the majority of the members of 
the lower House', while in British Guiana, Malta, Jamaica and [Malawi] it [is] the person 
who appears 'best able' to command such support."102 In the Constitutions of the more 
recently established states, the Governor-General's discretion is even more clearly em-
phasised. For example, the Constitutions of Antigua, Barbuda, the Bahamas and Belize 
stipulate that where it "appears" to the Governor-General that a clear government has 
not emerged from the elections, the Governor-General "shall appoint the member ... 
who in his judgment is most likely to command the support of the rnajority."103 The 
situation is similar in Barbados where the Governor-General "shall, acting in his discre-
tion" appoint as Prime Minister the person who "in his judgment, is best able to com-
mand the confidence of a majority of members."1{)<\ In Mauritius the Governor-General is 
to act "in his own deliberate judgment and appoint "the member . .. who appears to 
IOI 
102 
103 
10. 
Above n 17, lxxxiii. 
Above n 17, born. 
Constitutions of Antigua and Barbuda s 69(2); the Bahamas ss 73(1) and 79(l)(a); Belize 
s 37(2) cited in above n 17, lxxiii. 
Constitution of Barbados ss 65(1) and 65(3) cited in above n 17, lxxiii. 
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him best able to command the support of a majority of the members."105 Finally, in the 
Cook Islands, the Queen's Representative appoints as Prime Minister "a member of the 
Parliament who commands the confidence of a majority of members"106 when the House 
is in session, and when it is not, "a member of the Parliament who in the opinion of the 
Queen's Representative, acting in his discretion, is likely to command the confidence of a 
majority of members."107 
The picture seems the same when we investigate constitutional provisions regarding 
requests for dissolutions. In Jamaica it appears that the Governor-General must act on 
the advice of the Prime Minister to dissolve Parliament with no discretionary power to 
refuse. 108 In other Commonwealth states with written constitutions, the Jamaican prac-
tice is stated as a general rule. Exceptions to this general rule are then given which 
appear to confer a wide discretion on the Governor-General to refuse a dissolution 
request. For instance, in Belize, St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines:109 
If the Prime Minister advises a dissolution and the Governor-General, acting in his own 
deliberate judgment, considers that the government . . . can be carried on without a dis-
solution and that a dissolution would not be in the best interests of [the country), he 
may, acting in his own deliberate judgment, refuse to dissolve [Parliament] . 
A further example is furnished by the Constitutions of the Bahamas, Barbados, Mauritius 
and St Kitts and Nevis where, if: 110 
the office of Prime Minister is vacant, and the Governor-General, acting in his own 
deliberate judgment, considers that there is no prospect of his being able to find within a 
reasonable time to make an appointment to that office . .. [he] shall dissolve Parliament 
Although this example does not speak directly to the issue of refusing a dissolution 
request, it does show how wide a discretion is conferred on the Governor-General with 
respect to dissolving Parliament. 
It is difficult to discern in these various codifications of the reserve powers any guidance 
as to how exactly the reserve powers of appointing a Prime Minister or refusing a re-
quest for a dissolution. If anything can be said, it is that the framers of these Constitu-
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
l lO 
Constitution of Mauritius s 59(3) cited in above n 17, lxxiii. 
Article 13(2) (a) , Constitution of the Cook Islands, cited in above n 17, lxxiii. 
Article 13(2)(b), Constitution of the Cook Islands, cited in above n 17, lxxiii. 
Constitution of Jamaica ss 71(2) and 71(3) in above n 17, xxxiv. 
Constitutions of Belize s 84(4)(a); St Lucia s 55(4)(a); St Vincent and the Grenadines s 
48(5)(a) , cited in above n 17, xxxiv. 
Constitutions of the Bahamas ss 66(2) and 79(1) ; Barbados ss 6(2) and 32; St Kitts and 
Nevis s 47(4) cited in above n 17, xxxv. 
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tions have not been able to pin down with certainty the conventions which regulate the 
exercise of the reserve powers and have instead preferred to err on the side of discretion. 
Underlining this point is the fact that the Australian Constitutional Convention of 1983 
expressly declared that the conventions underpinning the powers of appointing a Prime 
Minister and refusing a dissolution request were "Practices NOT Recognized and De-
clared"111 by it and RQ Quen~n-Baxter's consideration that:112 
[a]t least in the New Zealand situation, there is no need for wide and ill-defined discre-
tions to refuse a Prime Minister's advice to dissolve Parliament, or in any way to in.Ou-
ence the processes by which an existing Parliament finds, or fails to find, a .. . majority 
among its own members. 
As well as proving difficult for the drafters of constitutions to outline, when the courts 
have been faced with this question, they have proved themselves unable to offer any 
further guidance than that expressed in law, which, as already noted, is precious little. 
The case of Adegbenro v Akintola113 concerned the interpretation of various provisions of 
the Constitution of Western Nigeria. Article 33(10)(a) provided that: "the Governor shall 
not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer 
commands the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly." 
The Governor dismissed the Premier after he had received a letter signed by more than 
half of the members of the House, stating that they no longer supported the Premier, 
even though there had been no vote of no-confidence passed in the Premier prior to his 
dismissal. 
The question for the Privy Council was the meaning of the phrase "it appears to him 
that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of members." It was 
argued for the dismissed Premier that the words implicitly embodied the United King-
dom convention that the question of support can be registered only by the vote tally 
from the House. No other method of determining whether the Premier enjoyed the 
House's support was constitutional and thereby legal. 
111 
112 
113 
Prru:tices NOT Recognized and Declared by resolution of the Australian Constitutional Con-
vention (Parliament House, Adelaide, April 26-29 1983) appended to above n 51 (em-
phasis in original) . Note that in 1985, the Convention did attempt to lay down a proce-
dure for the appointment of a Prime Minister, see above n 51, which has been questioned 
by Forsey, above n 17, lxviii. 
Above n 19, 311. 
[1963] AC 614 (PC) . 
The Privy Council was not convinced by this argument, declaring that statute must 
supplant convention, and where it did, "in the end [it is] the wording of the constitution 
itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording can never be overridden by 
the extraneous principles of other Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated 
into the formulae [ of the Western Nigerian Constitution] ."114 
Their Lordships' eventual conclusion was that the Governor was under no legal restric-
tion as to whom he may consult or the material he may use in coming to his decision. 
Thus judicial consideration of codified conventions appears not to provide any greater 
assistance for Governors-General than codification itself. The certainty sought by Evatt 
does not appear to have been delivered by the solution he posed. As A Quentin-Baxter 
said: 11 5 
it is possible to give written expression to the conventions which specify the conditions 
which must exist before the Governor-General may exercise a reserve power but it is 
extraordinarily difficult to specify the manner in which those conditions are satisfied ... . 
[N]o written provision conferring discretionary powers requiring the exercise of a politi-
cal determination can provide for every imaginable contingency. 
The effects of codification are also questionable. From a strict separation of powers 
viewpoint it does not seem desirable to have political questions of the highly sensitive 
nature which the Governor-General seeks to answer when she exercises the reserve 
powers to become the province of the judiciary. The New Zealand Court of Appeal 
acknowledged as much in Burt v Attorney-Genera1116 where Cooke P approved the dicta 
of Lord Roskill in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service1 11 who 
considered that: 118 
Prerogative powers such as those relating to the making of treaties, the defence of the 
realm, the prerogative of mercy, the grant of honours, the dissolution of Parliament and the 
appointment of Ministers are not, I think, susceptible to judicial review because their 
nature and subject mater are such as not to be amenable to the judicial process. The 
courts are not the place [to determine these matters] . 
CCSU dealt with the reserve powers at common law. However, if codified in statutory 
form, the reserve powers would seem to be covered by the provisions of the Judicature 
l ll 
11 6 
117 
11 8 
Above n 113, 632 per Viscount Radcliffe . 
Above n 91, 250. 
[1992] 3 NZLR 672, 677-687. 
[1985] AC 374 (HL) (CCSU). 
Above n 117, 418. 
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Amendment Act 1972. 119 Thus they would be subject to review and furthermore, there 
seems to be no provision in the JAA which would enable the courts to decline to review 
the reserve powers, even though the question they investigate is intensely political in 
nature and their powers of elucidation limited. It is also difficult to envisage what sort of 
remedy the courts would devise for breach of such a rule and indeed, whether Parlia-
ment would take any notice of a court's pronouncements on the subject. It is a fascinat-
ing question whether the courts would be obliged to review the reserve powers once 
codified120 although there is support for tentatively concluding that they would not do 
so. Richardson J in CREEDNZ Inc v Govemor-Grneral121 remarked:122 
the willingness of the Courts to interfere with the exercise of discretionary decisions must 
be affected by the nature and subject-matter of the decision in question and by considera-
tion of the constitutional role of the body entrusted by statute with the exercise of the 
power . . . And where ... it is the decision of the Governor-General which is impugned, 
the realities of decision-making at that levd must be recognised. 
If the courts refuse to review the reserve powers we return to certainty as the justifica-
tion for codifying the reserve powers. Given that the ability of codification to provide 
certainty in this area is uncertain itself, we must also consider whether we wish to 
purchase this doubtful certainty at the price of flexibility. Conventions, as unwritten 
rules, are flexible and elastic, free to be adapted as the circumstances require or to fall 
into desuetude when no longer appropriate. They often grow from constitutional crises 
and are used to help resolve them. Just as we cannot predict constitutional crises, can we 
so confidently attempt to prescribe the remedy before we know the exact nature of the 
illness? In fact, it could be argued that to codify conventions creates or at least exacer-
bates constitutional crises. The post-1984 election constitutional crisis arose from the 
inflexibility which resulted from codifying in section 9 of the 1950 Civil List Act the 
convention that Ministers were required to be members of Parliament Another constitu-
tional convention had to be imported from Australia to resolve the problem until the 
matter was clarified by section 6(2)(a) of the Constitution Act 1986.123 Although further 
119 
LIO 
121 
122 
123 
Section 3(b) "a power or right conferred by or under any Act ... to exercise a statutory 
power of decision" OAA). 
And one which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
[1981] l NZLR 172. 
Above n 1122, 197-198 and 201 ; appvd Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] l NZLR 
222,230. 
Section 6(2)(a) "A person who is not a member of Parliament maybe appointed and may 
hold office as a member of the Executive Council or as a Minister of the Crown if that 
person was a candidate at the general election of members of the House of Representa-
tives held immediately preceding that person's appointment as a member of the Executive 
Council or as a Minister of the Crown but shall vacate office at the expiration of the 
period of 40 days beginning with the date of the appointment unless, within that period, 
that person becomes a member of Parliament" See also above n 17, xci and G Palmer 
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crises were effectively foreclosed by statutory intervention, it is salient to note that the 
initial crisis arose from the inflexibility of codified convention and was solved by an-
other, this time non-codified convention, adapted to fit the situation. 
EA Forsey, Evatt's equally well-respected constitutional contemporary made a character-
istically eloquent argument against codification with which it is fitting to close this 
section:124 
Conventions are essentially, and intensely practical. They rest ultimately on common 
sense. They are accordingly, flexible, adaptable. To embody them in an ordinary law is to 
ossify them. To embody them in a written Constitution is to petrify them. 
V CONCLUSION 
The reserve powers customarily occupy the top shelf in New Zealand's constitutional 
cupboard, shrouded in the dust of popular misunderstanding about or, more likely still, 
popular ignorance of their existence. It is only when constitutional crisis occurs, or 
seems imminent, that they are taken down from the top shelf, dusted off and put to 
work-work which is most important and fundamentally necessary. The reserve powers 
represent the last safeguard of our democratic constitution: they are necessary for its 
continued existence and, for that reason, important. They assume greater importance in 
light of New Zealand's endorsement of the MMP electoral system at the 1993 referen-
dum. Using the MMP system to determine the composition of Parliament raises the 
possibility that the Governor-General's reserve powers will be called on more often. She 
may be required to appoint a Prime Minister when the government is not clear or to 
consider requests for a dissolution of Parliament from a government unsure of its sup-
port in the House--or in some cases, from a potential government before Parliament has 
declared its support of any government. 
If the Governor-General is required to use the reserve powers more often, it is vital that 
they be credible and effective. Credibility and effectiveness can only come, it has been 
submitted, by the powers being exercised according to clear guidelines, soundly based in 
principle. These principles are those of Crown neutrality and democracy, meaning that 
the Governor-General should not only exercise her powers impartially but that she 
12i 
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should also be seen to do so; and that the reserve powers should be exercised with 
reference to the renewed vitality of Parliament it is predicted that MMP will bring. 
An analysis of the reserve powers of the Governor-General in the new context of an 
MMP Parliament, concludes with three new possible conventions which may guide the 
exercise of the reserve powers, practices which are founded in principle and buttressed 
by precedent. These suggested guidelines can be stated thus: 
(i) Power to refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament before the summoning of 
Parliament: the Governor-General should refuse the request and instead call Parliament as soon 
as practicable so that it may resolve any necessary constitutional issues. 
(ii) Power to appoint a Prime Minister: The Governor-General should appoint that person 
who seems best able to hold the confidence of the House of Representatives. That person should 
be identified after party political negotiations and, once identified, the Governor-General should 
satisfy herself that this is indeed the case by consultation with the appropriate parties. 
(iii) Power to refuse a request for a dissolution of Parliament when Parliament is in 
session: Parliament should not be dissolved if an alternative government exists in the House. The 
Governor-General should request that party leaders make clear their intended parliamentary 
alliances (preferably in writing) in order to determine whether this possible alternative govern-
ment exists. lf no such government is evidenced, the dissolution request should be acceded to. 
The final question in this examination of the reserve powers and their underlying under-
standings is whether they should be codified or not. Codification has been posited as the 
solution for the sometimes uncertain nature of the reserve powers. Yet an analysis of 
various attempts to codify the reserve powers shows that these attempts provide little 
certainty or guidance for the Head of State in reserve power decisions. Moreover, judicial 
interpretation of these statutes also furnishes little elaboration on how the general discre-
tion conferred on the Head of State is to be effected. Further, there remains the concern, 
acknowledged by the judiciary themselves, that such matters are not appropriate for 
judicial scrutiny. Codification would thus appear to serve little purpose. It also brings 
with it an "ossifying"125 effect that prevents these conventions from developing and 
adapting to the political arena wherein they must operate. 
To conclude, should the possible conventions outlined and suggested in this paper 
evolve into true conventions in future years, there must be an even greater sea-change to 
New Zealand's constitution before we can consider the drastic step of codification an 
attractive option. 
Above n 17, xc. 
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APPENDIX I 
Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) 1 
A 
BILL 
TO 
Extend and entrench the democratic rights of the electors of the A.D. 1988 
United Kingdom, through their representatives in the House of 
Commons, over all Crown Prerogatives that do not, at present, 
derive from statute; and for purposes connected therewith. 
W
HEREAS the people of the United Kingdom have an inherent right of 
self-government, through their elected representatives, over all deci-
sions made by government and Parliament; 
And whereas those rights of self-government are seriously limited by the 
5 secret exercise of executive power, without any statutory basis, under Crown 
prerogatives, for which ministers are not individually accountable to the 
House of Commons or to the electorate; 
And whereas the use of the Crown prerogatives is on such a scale, and of 
such a nature, as to constitute a major obstacle to the realization of the 
10 legitimate needs of the people, and may involve a denial of civil liberty and 
democratic rights and the rights of Parliament itself; 
Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with 
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and the Com-
mons, in the present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, 
15 as follows:-
30 
1. (1) All powers now exercised by Her Majesty's m1msters under the House of Com-
prerogatives of the Crown, shall require the assent of the House of Commons mons control of 
before having legal effect; and these shall include, amongst others, the powers. 
following powers:-
20 (a) to make Orders in Council; 
(b) to declare war; 
(c) to make peace; 
(d) to recognize foreign governments; 
(e) to sign or ratify treaties; 
25 CO to grant pardons; 
(g) to grant charters; 
(h) to confer honours; 
[Bill 117] 50/1 
Dissolution. 
Amendment of 
Parliament Acts. 
Enactment of 
Bills. 
Orders. 
Short title and 
commencement 
2 Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) 
(i) to make appointments; 
(j) to establish commissions; 
(k) to grant commissions; 
(1) to issue orders, and; 
(m) to issue all other executive powers not conferred by statute. 
(2) From the date on which this Act comes into force, all powers now 
exercised under the prerogative of the Crown, which are legislative in 
character, shall be presented to Parliament as Bills for enactment in the 
normal form. 
5 
(3) All administrative powers, of a general character, shall be published, 10 
and laid, as draft orders requiring the approval of the House of Commons by 
affirmative resolution. 
( 4) All cases involving individuals shall be published, and laid, as in-
dividual orders, subject to the power of the House of Commons to annul it 
by a negative resolution. 15 
(5) The House of Commons may, by resolution, require Her Majesty's 
Government to present an order under the provisions of this Act. 
2. The Speaker of the House of Commons shall have the sole respon-
sibility for advising on the dissolution of Parliament, and the issue of any 
invitation to a person to attempt to form a government; and such advice shall 20 
be confirmed by the House of Commons before it is transmitted to Her 
Majesty, and shall be binding on the Crown; and Parliament shall not be 
dissolved, except as is provided for in the Parliament Acts, as amended in 
section 3 below; nor shall any person be invited to form a government save 
as provided for in this Act. 25 
3. The Parliament Acts shall be amended to substitute ufour years" for the 
ufive years" now laid down for the maximum duration of a Parliament. 
4. All Bills presented to Parliament shall be deemed to be passed into law 
on their receiving a third reading in the House of Commons, and the words 
of enactment of all Bills shall to be amended to read as follows: "Be it enacted 
by the Authority of the Commons, in the present Parliament Assembled, as 
follows:-". 
5. All statutory instruments shall be deemed to have come into force when 
they have been approved by the House of Commons. 
6.-(l) This Act may be cited as the Crown Prerogatives (House of 
Commons Control) Act 1988. 
30 
35 
(2) This Act shall come into force on the date upon which the Royal 40 
Assent is given. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Auckland District Law Society Public Issues Committee The Holyoake Appointment 
(ADLS, Auckland, 1977). 
M Bassett Three Party Politics in New Zealand 1911-1931 (Historical Publications, Auck-
land, 1982). 
A Benn "Power, Parliament and the People" (1982) Sept/Oct New Socialist 9. 
R Blackburn "The Dissolution of Parliament: The Crown Prerogatives (House of Com-
mons Control) Bill 1988" (1989) 52 Modern LR 837. 
Sir D Blundell "Some reflections upon the office of Governor-General in New Zealand" 
(1980) 10 VUWLR 197. 
V Bogdanor (ed) Constitutions in Democratic Politics (Gower Publishing, Aldershot, 1988). 
V Bogdanor Multi-party Politics and the Constitution (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, 1983). 
R Brazier Constitutional Practice (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988). 
R Brazier "Government Formation from a Hung Parliament" ( 1986] Public Law 387. 
R Brazier "The non-legal constitution: thought on convention, practice and principle" 
(1992) 43 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 262. 
FM Brookfield "No Nodding Automaton: A Study of the Governor-General's Powers and 
Functions" (1978) NZLJ 491. 
FM Brookfield "The reconstituted office of Governor-General" (1985) NZLJ 356. 
D Butler Governing Without a Majority (Collins, London, 1983). 
D Butler and DA Low (eds) Sovereigns and Surrogates: Constitutional Heads of State in the 
Commonwealth (St Martin's Press, New York, 1991). 
Cabinet Office Manual (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1991). 
L Carroll Through the Looking-Glass (Golden Press, Racine, Wisconsin, 1970). 
A Castles "Post-election Constitutional usage in the Shadow of Mount Wellington: Tas-
mania's Constitutional Crisis, 1989" (1989) 12 Adel LR 292. 
M Chen "Remedying New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: is MMP part of the answer?" 
(1993) NZLJ 22. 
M Chen and Sir G Palmer Public Law in New Zealand (Oxford University Press, Auck-
land, 1993). 
L Cleveland and AD Robinson Readings in New Zealand Government (AH &: AW Reed, 
Wellington, 1977). 
AV Dicey Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, London, 1960). 
32 
Dissolution of Parliament (1877) New Zealand. Parliament. House of Representatives. 
Appendix to the journals vol 1, A. 7. 
"Documents Concerning the Constitutional Events which Surrounded The Tasmanian 
General Election in 1989" (1991) 2 Public LR 4. 
HV Evatt "The Discretionary Authority of Dominion Governors" (1940) 18 Canadian Bar 
Rev 1. 
HV Evatt and EA Forsey Evatt and Forsey on the Reserve Powers (Legal Books, Sydney, 
1990) . 
NA Faden The Constitutional Development of New Zealand in the first decade (LT Watkins, 
Wellington, 1938). 
H Gold (ed) New Zealand Politics in Perspective (3 ed, Longman Paul, Auckland, 1993). 
Great Britain Parliamentary Debates. 
G Hawke (ed) Changing Politics? (Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1993). 
J Hight and HD Bamford The Constitutional History of New Zealand (Whitcombe and 
Tombs, Wellington, 1914). 
I Jennings Cabinet Government (3 ed, Cambridge University Press, London, 1959). 
I Jennings The Law and the Constitution (University of London Press, London, 1959). 
PA Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Law Books Co, Sydney, 
1993). 
Sir K Keith "Canberra, 11 November 1975: What Need New Zealand Remember?" (ad-
dress to the AULSA Conference, Christchurch, 22-25 August 1976). 
ID Killey "Tasmania: A New Convention" (1991) 2 Public LR 221. 
HP Lee and G Winterton (eds) Australian Constitutional Perspectives (Law Books Co, 
Sydney, 1992) . 
D McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (Government Printer, Wellington, 
1985). 
BS Markesinis The Theory and Practice of Dissolution of Parliament (Cambridge University 
Press, London, 1972). 
G Marshall Constitutional Conventions (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984). 
G Marshall and GC Moodie Some Problems of the Constitution (Hutchinson & Co, Lon-
don, 1946) . 
Sir J Marshall "The Power of Dissolution as Defined and Exercised in New Zealand" 
(1977) LVIII The Parliamentarian 13. 
New Zealand Parliamentary Debates. 
G Palmer Unbridled Power (2 ed, Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987) . 
33 
G Palmer Constitution in Crisis (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992). 
Sir G Palmer "MMP and Ministerial Responsibility" (address to the "Public Accountability 
in the MMP environment" seminar, Wellington, 11-12 April 1994). 
Sir G Palmer "What Changes are Likely to the Legislative Process and other Functions of 
Parliament from MMP?" (address to the "MMP: Managing the Political/Public Sector 
Interface" seminar, Wellington, 24 March 1994). 
A Quentin-Baxter Review of the Letters Patent 1917 Constituting the Office of the Govemor-
General of New Zealand (Cabinet Office, Wellington, 1982). 
RQ Quentin-Baxter "The Governor-General's Constitutional Discretions: An essay to--
wards a re-definition" (1980) 10 VUWLR 289. 
Sir P Rawlinson "Dissolution in the United Kingdom" (1977) LVIII The Parliamentarian 
1. 
JB Ringer An Introduction to New Zealand Government (Hazard Press, Christchurch, 
1991). 
Republic Advisory Committee An Australian Republic-The Options The Report (Com-
monwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1993). 
C Sampford and D Wood "Codification of Constitutional Conventions in Australia" 
[ 1987] Public Law 231. 
CJG Sampford "Recognize and Declare" An Australian Experiment in Codifying Constitu-
tional Conventions" (1987) 7 Oxford J Legal Studies 369. 
KJ Scott The New Zealand Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962). 
SA de Smith and R Brazier Constitutional and Administrative Law (6 ed, Penguin Books, 
London, 1989). 
DL Stevens The Crown, the Governor-General and the Constitution (Unpublished UM 
(Hons) Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1974). 
K Strom Minority Government and Majority Rule ( Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1990). 
A Tanney "The Four Percent Solution" (1992) 142 New LJ 453. 
P Temple Making your vote count (John Mclndoe, Dunedin, 1992). 
The General Election and Electoral Referendum 1993, New Zealand. Parliament. House of 
Representatives. Appendix to the journals, E.9. 
Dame C Tizard "Crown and Anchor: The present role of the Governor-General in New 
Zealand" (Founder's Lecture for the Friends of the Turnbull Library, 26 June 1993). 
ECS Wade and AW Bradley Constitutional and Administrative Law (10 ed, Longman, 
London, 1985). 
G Winterton "Tasmania's Hung Parliament, 1989" [1992] Public Law 423. 
34 
l'i 
GA Wood "New Zealand's Patriated Governor-General" (1986) 38 Political Science 113. 
TABLE OF CASES 
Adegbenro v Akintola [1963] AC 614. 
Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222. 
Attorney-General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1..1.d [ 1920] AC 508. 
Burt v Attorney-General [ 1992] 3 NZLR 672. 
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General (1981] 1 NZLR 172. 
Liversidge v Anderson [1942] AC 206. 
Reference Re Amendment of the Constitution of Ca.ruula (1982) 125 DLR (3d) 1. 
Shapiro v United States 335 US 1 (1948) . 
36 
TABLE OF LEGISI.ATIVE MATERIAL 
Constitutions 
Constitution of Antigua 
Constitution of the Bahamas 
Constitution of Barbados 
Constitution of Barbuda 
Constitution of Belize 
Constitution of the Cook Islands 
Constitution of Jamaica 
Constitution of Mauritius 
Constitution of St Kitts and Nevis 
Constitution of St Lucia 
Constitution of St Vincent and the Grenadines 
Constitution of Western Nigeria 
Statutes 
Civil List Act 1950 
Constitution Act 1986 
Electoral Act 1956 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
Bills 
Crown Prerogatives (House of Commons Control) Bill 1988 (UK) 
37 
Typeset by the author to Victoria University Faculty of Law style and output by Jack Yan & As-
sociates, Wellington, New Zealand in ITC Berkeley Oldstyle Medium 11/19.5 pt with footnotes in 
ITC Berkeley Oldstyle Medium 10/12 pt. For JY &A products, in North America, telephone Preci-
sion Type on (800) 248-3668. All other areas telephone 64 4 387-3213. 
t7 }Y&A. New Zealand's leading type design firm. 
A Fine According to Library 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books 
PLC.AS~ [Tl.'.;;1i; BY 
\ "J.,.JV'-'<.. qg 
TO W .ll . NTf:PLO.~. r..:S 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
'iff ''j i!llii'11' 1li1li1'1i~if I llii1iii1 
3 7212 00454830 9 
1 Morris, Caro1ine 
Fo1der Sarah 
Mo The Governor-
Genera1, the 
reserve powers, 
Par1iament and MMP 

